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Tobacco is a pesticide-intensive crop. With
nearly 27 million pounds of pesticides (includ-
ing insecticides, herbicides, fungicides, and
suckercides) applied to the U.S.-grown crop
from 1994 to 1998, it ranks sixth in terms of
the amount of pesticides applied per acre
[U.S. Government Accounting Ofﬁce (GAO)
2003]. The tobacco industry regards pesticides
as essential to tobacco production, stating that
“the crop could not be produced economically
without them” (Davis 1989; Philip Morris
1990b). According to industry documents,
government-imposed limitations on pesticide
use “may present a serious impediment” to the
international tobacco trade (Hill 1989).
Internal tobacco industry documents pro-
vide a window into the tobacco industry’s
activities regarding pesticide regulations. These
case studies drawn from industry documents
describe the tobacco industry’s responses to
pesticide regulatory action. The documents
also provide insight into the relationships
between the tobacco industry and pesticide
regulatory agencies and tensions between busi-
ness and public health interests.
The Tobacco Industry
Documents
Litigation against the tobacco industry has
resulted in the release of nearly 7 million previ-
ously secret tobacco industry documents (Bero
2003; Malone and Balbach 2000). Scanned
PDF versions of original handwritten, typed, or
printed documents have been archived at the
University of California, San Francisco, library
in electronic repositories, searchable using basic
keywords (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu).
Between July 2003 and February 2004, we
searched the archives using a “snowball” sam-
pling strategy, beginning with broad search
terms (“pesticide” and “crop protection agent”)
and using retrieved documents to identify more
speciﬁc search terms (such as names of speciﬁc
pesticides, people, and regulatory agencies).
Table 1 provides examples of keyword searches
and the number of documents yielded. This
process produced nearly 300,000 documents
relating to many different pesticides. The ﬁrst
author reviewed these documents’ index entries
and excluded duplicates and documents unre-
lated to pesticide regulatory issues. The ﬁnal
sample size was approximately 2,000 docu-
ments, spanning 1974–2001.
We also ﬁled Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) requests with the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) on pesticide issues
raised by information in the industry docu-
ments, resulting in 3,885 pages of government
documents. Finally, we reviewed public health
agency reports based on industry documents
(Zeltner et al. 2000). We analyzed the indus-
try, government, and public health agency
documents by assembling chronologically con-
structed case studies, a method common to
sociology, political science, and anthropology
(e.g., analyses of a corporation’s organizational
structure, a social movement, or a tribe) (Hill
1993; Yin 1994) (Table 2). The pesticides
chosen for inclusion [methoprene, the ethylene
bisdithiocarbamates (EBDCs), and phosphine]
were those for which sufficient information
related to regulatory activities was available in
the archives to construct a case study.
Pesticides and Tobacco
Pesticides used on tobacco are also used regu-
larly on food crops. As with food crops, trace
amounts of pesticides remain on tobacco leaves
after treatment; typically, residue levels decline
during the drying and manufacturing process,
although additional pesticides may be applied
to the finished product (U.S. GAO 2003).
Although pesticides increase production of
tobacco and food crops, pesticide exposure
may harm humans; thus, regulatory agencies
such as the U.S. EPA may set limits on the
amount of pesticide residue permitted in or on
food and tobacco and establish standards for
workers handling pesticides. Because tobacco is
burned and the smoke inhaled, active and pas-
sive smokers are exposed to pyrolyzed pesticide
residues (U.S. GAO 2003). The U.S. EPA has
concluded that this exposure poses no short-
term risk, but little is known about the long-
term health effects (U.S. GAO 2003).
Methoprene
In 1974, Philip Morris formed a partnership
with the chemical company Zoecon to mar-
ket a new insecticide (Manzelli 1975). The
insecticide’s active ingredient, methoprene,
acted as an endocrine disruptor in cigarette
Environmental Health Perspectives • VOLUME 113 | NUMBER 12 | December 2005 1659
Commentary
Address correspondence to P. A. McDaniel, Center for
Tobacco Control Research and Education, University
of California-San Francisco, 530 Parnassus Avenue,
Suite 366, San Francisco, CA 94143-1390, USA.
Telephone: (415) 514-9342. Fax: (415) 514-9345.
E-mail: patricia.mcdaniel@ucsf.edu
We thank E.A. Smith and B. Skinner for critically
reviewing drafts of the manuscript. 
This research was supported by grants CA90789
and CA095989 from the National Cancer Institute
and by American Legacy fellowship funding.
The authors declare they have no competing
financial interests. G.S. is employed by an environ-
mental nonprofit organization with an interest in
ensuring that regulations of toxic chemicals are as
health protective as feasible.
Received 27 July 2004; accepted 8 August 2005.
The Tobacco Industry and Pesticide Regulations: Case Studies from Tobacco
Industry Archives
Patricia A. McDaniel,1 Gina Solomon,2,3 and Ruth E. Malone4
1Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education, University of California, San Francisco, California, USA; 2Natural Resources Defense
Council, San Francisco, California, USA; 3Division of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, Department of Medicine, University of
California, San Francisco, California, USA; 4Department of Social and Behavioral  Sciences and School of Nursing, University of California,
San Francisco, California, USA
Tobacco is a heavily pesticide-dependent crop. Because pesticides involve human safety and health
issues, they are regulated nationally and internationally; however, little is known about how tobacco
companies respond to regulatory pressures regarding pesticides. In this study we analyzed internal
tobacco industry documents to describe industry activities aimed at inﬂuencing pesticide regulations.
We used a case study approach based on examination of approximately 2,000 internal company docu-
ments and 3,885 pages of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency documents obtained through
Freedom of Information Act requests. The cases involved methoprene, the ethylene bisdithiocarba-
mates, and phosphine. We show how the tobacco industry successfully altered the outcome in two
cases by hiring ex-agency scientists to write reports favorable to industry positions regarding pesticide
regulations for national (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) and international (World Health
Organization) regulatory bodies. We also show how the industry worked to forestall tobacco pesticide
regulation by attempting to self-regulate in Europe, and how Philip Morris encouraged a pesticide
manufacturer to apply for higher tolerance levels in Malaysia and Europe while keeping tobacco
industry interest a secret from government regulators. This study suggests that the tobacco industry is
able to exert considerable inﬂuence over the pesticide regulatory process and that increased scrutiny of
this process and protection of the public interest in pesticide regulation may be warranted. Key words:
ethylene bisdithiocarbamates, Environmental Protection Agency, methoprene, pesticide regulation,
phosphine, tobacco industry, World Health Organization. Environ Health Perspect 113:1659–1665
(2005). doi:10.1289/ehp.7452 available via http://dx.doi.org/ [Online 8 August 2005]beetles and tobacco moths, preventing their
larvae from maturing into adult insects
(Manzelli 1975). Philip Morris anticipated that
methoprene would replace phosphine, a com-
mon warehouse fumigant (Philip Morris 1988)
and pledged to assist Zoecon in introducing
methoprene “in as many countries as we can”
(Seligman 1982).
Some countries have regulations that
require the establishment of maximum residue
limits (MRLs) for pesticides on crops; however,
Philip Morris determined that MRLs were not
required in all countries, especially for pesti-
cides on nonfood crops such as tobacco (Ryan
1991). Philip Morris asked Zoecon “to not
force this issue and submit for MRLs when not
required” (Lindahl 1992b). In April 1991
Zoecon alerted Philip Morris’s director of
research that the Malaysian pesticide board had
recently set an MRL of 1.0 ppm for metho-
prene on tobacco (Hutney 1991). Zoecon con-
sidered 1.0 ppm too low to enable the effective
use of methoprene; the level supported by the
labeled application rate was 10 ppm (Ryan
1992). Philip Morris requested that Zoecon
ask for an even higher MRL of 15 ppm to
allow for application errors (Greenberg and
Transon 1992; McCuen 1992). Zoecon repre-
sentatives met with government authorities
and requested a change to 15 ppm (Hutney
1991).
A Zoecon representative informed Philip
Morris that “in order to avoid surprises of
this nature in the future,” he had directed
Zoecon’s pharmaceutical group to obtain
information from health authorities in other
countries regarding the commodities for
which methoprene tolerances were assigned
(which could include foods such as rice and
mushrooms as well as tobacco) (Hutney
1991). Assigning this task to the pharmaceu-
tical group instead of the pesticide group, the
Zoecon representative wrote, “will not arouse
the curiosity of the health directorates and
will allow us to keep our promise to the
tobacco industry, namely, that we won’t initi-
ate queries that may cause the health authori-
ties to direct attention to tobacco” (Hutney
1991).
In April 1992, George Lindahl of Zoecon
faxed a letter to Bob McCuen, head of Philip
Morris’s biochemical research, outlining some
of his concerns about Philip Morris’s approach
to establishing MRLs for methoprene on
tobacco (Lindahl 1992b). In regard to
Zoecon’s effort to establish an MRL of
15 ppm in Malaysia, Lindahl explained that 
I know we simply argued this case without any
data to support our request. In more advanced
countries, this tactic will not succeed. … All our
data demonstrate the need for a 10 ppm MRL. If a
higher value is desired then we will require data
from real ﬁeld operations showing that a worse [sic]
case scenario for faulty application will result in a
15 ppm residue, and hence the need for this value.
(Lindahl 1992b)
In a fax following this one, Lindahl asked
Philip Morris to provide such data; a hand-
written comment from a Philip Morris
employee who reviewed the fax noted that
“data doesn’t [sic] exist” (Lindahl 1992a).
Initially, the Malaysian authorities agreed to
increase methoprene’s MRL to 10 ppm
(Lindahl 1992c); subsequently, it was raised
to 15 ppm (Mueller and Ward 1998). Philip
Morris continued to advocate (through
Zoecon) for MRLs of 15 ppm in Italy and
Germany (Greenberg and Transon 1992).
In the meantime, anticipating the cre-
ation of a single European market with uni-
form pesticide regulations, Philip Morris had
asked the longtime tobacco industry law
ﬁrm, Shook, Hardy, and Bacon, to prepare a
document with MRL recommendations for
possible submission to the European
Community (Kemna 1991). Philip Morris
ﬁrst provided a draft of recommended MRLs
to the Scientific Working Group of the
Confederation of European Community
Cigarette Manufacturers (CECCM) (Philip
Morris 1991c). At their June 1991 meeting,
members of this group (including representa-
tives of Philip Morris, British American
Tobacco, R.J. Reynolds, Gallaher, and
Rothmans) recommended that the document
be rewritten as a voluntary code of practice “to
be used pre-emptively … in advance of any
EC [European Community] initiative” to
impose formal regulations on pesticide residue
limits on tobacco (Philip Morris 1991a). A
meeting participant reported, “It is hoped
that, by implementing this Code, the EC
Commission would not any longer see
the need to develop a formal EC regulation
on pesticide residues in tobacco (products)”
(Mueller 1991). Manuel Bourlas, Philip
Morris’s director of research and development,
was appointed chair of a subgroup of tobacco
company representatives who were to assist in
preparing the code (Philip Morris 1991a).
This voluntary code underwent numerous
revisions throughout 1991 and 1992 (CECCM
1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 1992d, 1992e;
Philip Morris 1991b). Although 236 regulated
and unregulated tobacco pesticides were in use
at the time (Mitchell 1991b), the voluntary
code proposed MRLs for only 25–27 pesticides
[including chlordane, dichlorodiphenyl-
trichloroethane (DDT), lindane, dithiocarba-
mates, methoprene, and maleic hydrazide].
According to British American Tobacco’s
Terry Mitchell, “many of the substances in the
list are no longer recommended for tobacco
production” (e.g., DDT) (Mitchell 1991a).
Moreover, this list did not impose “any con-
straint automatically on non-specified sub-
stances” (Mitchell 1991a). Mitchell noted that
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Table 1. Number of documents yielded by searches of tobacco company collections at the Legacy
Tobacco Documents Library using selected key words and wildcards(*).
Tobacco company
American Brown and Philip R.J.
Key word Tobacco Williamson Lorillard Morris Reynolds
Pesticide(*) 224 232 872 7,632 6,095
Crop protection agent(*) 3 60 66 1,533 193
Kabat/methoprene 65 182 604 5,416 2,336
Dithiocarbamate/EBDC(*) 1 22 130 278 275
Phosphine 28 21 195 247 580
World Health Organization/WHO 909 2,047 6,769 28,902 14,024
Environmental Protection Agency/EPA 1,423 2,082 23,791 155,094 24,961
Agrochemical Advisory Committee 0 37 48 684 383
Table 2. Overview of case studies.
Pesticide Regulatory action Dates Agency Tactics Outcome
Methoprene MRL of 1.0 ppm 1991–1995 Malaysian pesticide Work through chemical industry partners to avoid raising tobacco MRL raised to 15 ppm
board issues, request higher MRL with no supporting research
Methoprene, Industry concern about 1991–1993 European Community Attempt to create voluntary MRLs to forestall regulation No voluntary MRLs, no EC
others future MRLs regulations
EBDCs/ETU Potential imposition of 1989–1993 UN FAO/WHO JMPR Hire ex-WHO scientist to review EBDCs and ETU, covertly lobby ETU listed as not
residue tolerances and assist JMPR genotoxic, higher ADI
assigned
Phosphine 15 proposed risk mitigation 1998–2001 U.S. EPA Hire consultant with EPA ties to challenge scientiﬁc basis of Worker exposure standard
measures including worker proposed exposure standard, write journal article increased to 0.3 ppm
exposure standard of 0.03 ppm
UN FAO, United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization.this lack of limits was “highly desirable”
(Mitchell 1991a).
In December 1992, Walter Russell, a legal
assistant, reported that the code “has undergone
two more revisions (by SHB) [Shook, Hardy,
and Bacon] and it [is] currently watered down,
but still causing much agitation” (Philip Morris
1992). Russell pointed out that the code set
MRLs that Philip Morris “might have trouble
complying with” if they were to become inter-
national standards (Philip Morris 1992). In
addition, “failure to comply with tolerances
written by the tobacco industry which might
come up during litigation would put the
tobacco industry at great disadvantage” (Philip
Morris 1992). He indicated that Philip Morris
had decided to withdraw its support from the
voluntary code (Philip Morris 1992). In 1993,
the tobacco companies suspended work on the
document due to “principle disagreements both
within and between participating companies”
(R.J. Reynolds 1993). Throughout the 1990s,
the tobacco industry continued to anticipate
European Union harmonization of tobacco
pesticide MRLs (Philip Morris 1995); as of
April 2004, the European Union had estab-
lished community-level MRLS for 150 pesti-
cides, but none speciﬁcally applied to tobacco
(European Union 2004).
EBDC Fungicides
In 1987, the U.S. EPA initiated a review of
EBDC fungicides, prompted by the agency’s
determination that a breakdown product of
EBDCs, ethylene thiourea (ETU), was a prob-
able human carcinogen (U.S. EPA 1987).
Anticipating the U.S. EPA’s cancellation of
many EBDC uses, U.S. manufacturers volun-
tarily withdrew EBDC registrations for all but
13 food crops in 1989, including wheat and
corn (U.S. EPA 1989). At least one company
continued to hold registrations for EBDCs on
tobacco, but only for seed bed use, not plants
(Arce 1989).
In internal documents, the tobacco indus-
try expressed concern that the U.S. EPA’s
action could result in the “imposition of poten-
tially crippling product residue tolerances” in
Europe [Centre de Coopération pour les
Recherches Scientifiques Relatives au Tabac
(CORESTA) 1989b; Mitchell 1990]. EBDCs
were regarded as vital to control blue mold
outbreaks in Europe (Philip Morris 1990a). In
October 1989, members of CORESTA, an
international tobacco research organization
with members drawn largely from the tobacco
industry, established a subcommittee to “pro-
vide regulatory agencies with a sound basis for
the development of tobacco agro-chemical reg-
ulations” (CORESTA 1989a, 1989b).
As discussed in a larger World Health
Organization (WHO) report on tobacco
industry inﬂuence at that agency, the subcom-
mittee hired a consultant, Gaston Vettorazzi,
to provide advice on influencing regulation
(CORESTA 1990b; Zeltner et al. 2000).
Vettorazzi was a former WHO toxicologist
and former technical secretary of the Joint
Food and Agriculture Organization/WHO
Meeting on Pesticide Residues (JMPR), an
international meeting of scientists whose deci-
sions often formed the basis of international
law (Zeltner et al. 2000). Selected partly for his
“old boys’ contacts” (Reif 1991b), Vettorazzi’s
initial duties were to provide a review and
analysis of toxicologic data on EBDCs and
ETU (CORESTA 1990a).
Some CORESTA members were con-
cerned that Vettorazzi’s review might conclude
that EBDCs were unsafe (Beuchat 1990).
However, according to one member’s notes, at
his first meeting with the subcommittee in
April 1990, Vettorazzi stated that “someone
has to lay the red carpet for [me], otherwise [I]
can spoil more than help” (Reif 1990).
Vettorazzi’s initial review concluded that
ETU was neither carcinogenic nor genotoxic
(Vettorazzi 1991a). Some of the tobacco indus-
try scientists commented that this statement
was “too strong in light of the NTP feeding
studies”—a reference to the U.S. National
Toxicology Program’s conclusion that animal
studies showed clear evidence of ETU’s car-
cinogenicity (Reif 1991a). Vettorazzi subse-
quently revised his conclusions, stating that
ETU’s “toxicity, including carcinogenicity, can
be explained by the known mechanisms of
action characteristic of thyroid-function
inhibiting agents” (Vettorazzi 1991b). Thus,
he stated, a threshold could be set below which
ETU did not cause thyroid tumors (Vettorazzi
1991b).
CORESTA authorized the distribution of
Vettorazzi’s revised report to his former col-
leagues at WHO, once all references to tobacco
and CORESTA were removed (CORESTA
1992). WHO’s JMPR was scheduled to review
EBDCs/ETU in 1993; if this review were
favorable, the tobacco industry would be
assured continued access to EBDCs in Europe
(Zeltner et al. 2000).
With CORESTA funding ($100,000 a
year) and approval, Vettorazzi offered to assist
J. Herrman, of the JMPR WHO Secretariat,
with JMPR toxicologic reviews, without dis-
closing his tobacco industry ties (Herrman
1991; Vettorazzi 1991c, 1992a). Vettorazzi
wrote and reviewed several working papers on
compounds to be discussed at the 1992 JMPR,
including the EBDC thiram (Herrman 1992;
Vettorazzi 1992b). One outcome of that meet-
ing was the reestablishment, at a higher level,
of the previously cancelled Acceptable Daily
Intake (ADI) for thiram (Vettorazzi 1992b).
Vettorazzi continued his work with
WHO in 1993, supplying his CORESTA-
funded reviews to the adviser responsible for
drafting the working paper that would form
the basis of the September JMPR on EBDCs/
ETU without revealing their sponsor (Zeltner
et al. 2000). Vettorazzi also attended the
September meeting as an invited “temporary
adviser” (Zeltner et al. 2000). The meeting’s
outcome reﬂected Vettorazzi’s conclusions. In
contrast to the U.S. EPA, JMPR determined
that ETU was not genotoxic, and thus raised
the ADI level from 0.002 to 0.004 mg/kg body
weight (Black 1993). CORESTA considered
this “a very positive result for the industry,”
since it “clearly indicates that the ‘carcinogenic-
ity’ of [ETU] is not really a burning issue any
longer” (CORESTA 1994; Mueller 1993).
JMPR’s safety standard became part of interna-
tional trade law, preserving tobacco industry
access to EBDCs (Zeltner et al. 2000). Soon
after the JMPR meeting, CORESTA extended
Vettorazzi’s contract for 18 months, listing one
of his duties as providing “information about
the activities of pesticide action groups”
(CORESTA 1993). He was to be paid another
$100,000 (CORESTA 1993). Vettorazzi con-
tinued working for CORESTA until at least
2001, when the organization paid him $30,000
to monitor international activities related to
tobacco pesticide residues and registrations
(CORESTA 2001).
Phosphine
Phosphine is a fumigant used on stored com-
modities, including nuts, seeds, grains, coffee,
tobacco, and ﬁnished cigarettes to kill insects.
Because of the risks it poses, applicators are
advised to wear respirators and protective
clothing, and warehouses must be sealed to
prevent leaks that contribute to air pollution
and endanger nearby residents (U.S. EPA
1998b). By the early 1990s, several case
reports had been published noting sometimes
fatal phosphine poisoning among workers
and community members (Garry et al. 1989,
1993; Heyndrickx et al. 1976; Schoonbroodt
et al. 1992; Wilson et al. 1980).
In December 1998, the U.S. EPA pro-
posed a series of 15 risk mitigation measures
(RMMs) for phosphine. The U.S. EPA’s pri-
mary concern was the risk that phosphine
posed to applicators and community residents
(U.S. EPA 1998b). Thus, the RMMs included
a threshold limit value of 0.03 ppm of phos-
phine during fumigation (reduced from the
existing 0.3-ppm standard), the establishment
of a 500-foot buffer zone around all fumigated
structures, and prior notification of all resi-
dents living within 750 feet of a fumigated
structure (U.S. EPA 1998a).
The Tobacco Association of the United
States, in a letter to the U.S. EPA, stated
that the economic burdens imposed by the
RMMs would “make it virtually impossible
for our industry to continue to fumigate
stored tobacco” (Ward 1999). The Tobacco
Association, R.J. Reynolds, Philip Morris, and
The tobacco industry and pesticide regulations
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continued use of phosphine formed a lobbying
group, the Commodity Industry Coalition for
Phosphine Fumigation (Harrell 1999).
R.J. Reynolds, represented primarily by
toxicologist Joel Seckar, took an active role in
the Commodity Industry Coalition (Seckar
1999c). The company calculated that comply-
ing with the U.S. EPA’s buffer zone require-
ment would cost approximately $50 million
in new land and warehouse purchases (R.J.
Reynolds 1999a). Increasing the time required
to aerate warehouses before employee reentry
to comply with the worker exposure limit of
0.03 ppm would increase costs, as would the
possibility of liability suits brought by nearby
residents notiﬁed of phosphine use (Degesch
America 1998; R.J. Reynolds 1999d).
Coalition members lobbied Congress,
released media statements, worked closely
with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and
attended U.S. EPA-sponsored stakeholder
meetings (Goldman 1998; Lyon 1999; R.J.
Reynolds 1999b, 1999c). Their message was
that the proposed RMMs were overly conserv-
ative, based on “anecdotal information and
hypothetical risk” rather than on “sound sci-
ence” (Lyon 1999; Ong and Glantz 2001). To
challenge the scientific basis of the U.S.
EPA’s proposals, the coalition decided to hire
an expert whose research would support exist-
ing standards (Seckar 1999h). They chose
Sciences International, a consulting ﬁrm spe-
cializing in health and environmental risk
assessment. It was headed by Elizabeth
Anderson, a former director of the Carcinogen
Assessment Group and the Office of Health
and Environmental Assessment at the U.S.
EPA (Sciences International 2005). She was
also an experienced expert defense witness,
having served in that capacity in a number of
environmental lawsuits brought against corpo-
rations (Anderson 1999c).
To support the Commodity Industry
Coalition’s assertion that the proposed expo-
sure level of 0.03 ppm was too conservative,
Sciences International focused on the inter-
species uncertainty factor. The U.S. EPA had
ﬁrst determined from a published subchronic
toxicity study of rats that there were no
observed effects attributable to inhaled phos-
phine at 3 ppm (Seckar 1999a). To extrapo-
late to humans, the U.S. EPA had then used
two 10-fold uncertainty factors, one for
intraspecies variability and one for interspecies
variability, to arrive at a maximum exposure
level of 0.03 ppm (Sciences International
1999c). Documents indicate that Sciences
International’s strategy was to convince the
U.S. EPA that the interspecies uncertainty fac-
tor was unnecessary, showing that because a
number of animal species reacted in the same
manner to phosphine, humans were similar
enough that the interspecies uncertainty factor
could be removed (Seckar 1999a, 1999b).
This would leave only the intraspecies factor
of 10, which would result in a maximum
exposure level for humans of 0.3 ppm, the
existing standard.
In April 1999, the U.S. EPA representa-
tives met with a small group of Commodity
Industry Coalition members, including R.J.
Reynolds’s Seckar and Sciences International’s
Anderson (Seckar 1999a). Anderson ques-
tioned the U.S. EPA’s interspecies uncertainty
factor, citing several animal studies and an
epidemiologic study to suggest that the U.S.
EPA’s calculations were too conservative
(Seckar 1999a). In an e-mail, Seckar noted that
Anderson’s presentation was very effective, as
evidenced by the fact that U.S. EPA represen-
tatives were now informing coalition members
that the 0.03 ppm standard “was not ‘set in
stone,’” a direct contradiction of earlier state-
ments to the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(Bair 1999; Seckar 1999d). (Despite Freedom
of Information Act requests, we were unable to
obtain U.S. EPA documents related to its
meetings with the coalition.)
Soon after, Sciences International asked
the Commodity Industry Coalition for addi-
tional funding to turn its phosphine report
into a peer-reviewed journal article (Turim
1999). In a memo to Seckar, Anderson
(1999b) explained that 
My experience is that consultant reports funded
by those being regulated, and written expressly for
the EPA, are easily and frequently ignored or dis-
missed by the Agency, no matter how scholarly.
However, a paper or article that is peer-reviewed
and published, or in the peer review process for
publication, in an accepted scientific journal can
neither be ignored nor dismissed.
Anderson suggested that since she was editor-
in-chief of Risk Analysis, “perhaps the peer
review process could be expedited if we decide
that it is the journal of choice” (Anderson
1999b). R.J. Reynolds, Brown and Williamson,
and several other tobacco companies agreed
to fund most of the cost of this work (Seckar
1999e). The paper was published in Risk
Analysis in 2004, with the acknowledgment
that “This work was supported by the
Phosphine/Metal Phosphide Coalition, consist-
ing of the producers and users of phosphine
and metal phosphides for the control of insects
in stored commodities” (Pepelko et al. 2004).
Coalition members also pursued other
strategies. At a meeting with U.S. EPA repre-
sentatives in March 1999, the Commodity
Industry Coalition proposed that the U.S. EPA
participate in a series of small, coalition-
sponsored focus groups to “educate [EPA] on
the issues involved with … fumigations”
(Seckar 1999g). One such group met in May
1999, when tobacco companies demonstrated
a tobacco warehouse fumigation (Ward and
Cowan 1999). The following month, several
companies conducted additional emissions
tests to show that the proposed 500-foot buffer
was unnecessary (Bridges 1995). However, an
e-mail message from a Philip Morris employee
indicated that Philip Morris’s test coordinator
had “some reservations regarding the quality of
the test design/data generation” and that he
himself believed that “the test plan and meth-
ods will provide, literally, no information, so it
won’t hurt us to do it” (Bridges 1995).
In June 1999, Sciences International sub-
mitted a first draft of its phosphine toxicity
review to some coalition members (Sciences
International 1999a). A reviewer from the
coalition’s lobbying ﬁrm pointed out that the
animal studies cited did little to support the
idea that the interspecies uncertainty factor
should be eliminated “since most [of the ani-
mals] appear to be rat or mouse strains with
similar breathing characteristics” (Wilkinson
1999). Instead, the studies cited by Sciences
International seemed to support the idea
that phosphine called for a conservative stan-
dard, as they indicated that “phosphine is a
very toxic material to most species tested”
(Wilkinson 1999). Another reviewer noted
that the uncertain and tentative tone of the
report “will trigger concerns by EPA and they
will say ‘if [an] expert in the field states that
there remains great uncertainty, maybe we are
on solid ground by being very conservative’”
(Barolo 1999a). Sciences International staff
revised the report, removing tentative state-
ments and asserting that their work to date
supported reducing the interspecies uncer-
tainty factor to 1 (effectively eliminating it),
thus preserving the existing exposure standard
of 0.3 ppm (Sciences International 1999b).
They submitted this revised interim report
to the U.S. EPA in July 1999 (Sciences
International 1999b). At a Commodity
Industry Coalition meeting that same month,
coalition consultant Dan Barolo, former direc-
tor of the U.S. EPA’s Office of Pesticide
Programs (OPP), reportedly urged members
to speed their efforts because 
phosphine is quite hazardous when used improp-
erly. The more the Coalition slows the process, the
greater the chance for an accident with possible
fatalities, which would send EPA back into conser-
vative mode and make it far more difficult for
them to publish reasonable RMMs. (Seckar 1999f)
In August, John Whalan, a toxicologist at
the U.S. EPA’s Health Effects Division, sum-
marized in a memo his analysis of Sciences
International’s interim report (Whalan 1999).
He noted that 
there is no precedent for using an [interspecies
uncertainty factor] of 1 when establishing … an
inhalation regulatory value in the Health Effects
Division. The only time an interspecies [uncer-
tainty factor] is not applicable is when human data
are used. The available data do not support deviat-
ing from Agency policy, and the Coalition did not
provide any new data. (Whalan 1999)
McDaniel et al.
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He also pointed out that Sciences International’s
review of animal studies, intended to show that
phosphine toxicity was relatively constant
across species, was largely “irrelevant” because
it did not include a comparison of toxicity for a
small versus large mammal.
In September 1999, phosphine registrants
and several coalition members again met with
U.S. EPA ofﬁcials to discuss alternative RMMs
proposed by the coalition (Seckar 1999i).
Instead of a 500-foot buffer and a 750-foot
neighbor notiﬁcation requirement, the coali-
tion recommended a “site management plan”
that required companies to develop emergency
preparedness measures. The U.S. EPA asked
the Commodity Industry Coalition to reword
its proposals to specify how and when work-
ers and bystanders would be informed of
danger (Seckar 1999i). On the exposure limit
for workers, the U.S. EPA now proposed a
0.1-ppm standard (reflecting a reduction
from 10 to 3 in the interspecies uncertainty
factor) based upon Sciences International’s
interim report (despite the weaknesses noted
by Whalan) (Seckar 1999i). (The U.S. EPA
failed to provide memos or notes regarding
this decision.)
In several fall 1999 memos to Seckar,
Sciences International staff explained that
they thought it would be difﬁcult to convince
the U.S. EPA to drop the interspecies uncer-
tainty factor without human exposure studies
(Anderson 1999a; Gray 1999). Commodity
Industry Coalition members expressed reluc-
tance to commit to human studies without
confirmation that this would convince the
U.S. EPA to “give up” the uncertainty factor
(Barolo 1999b). Barolo commented to
Seckar, “I do not believe it will be easy for
OPP to abandon both safety factors. There
are too many unknowns from children to
endocrine to reliability of studies to absence
of dog/monkey study. … Some day they are
going to figure out there is a 0.1 ppm stan-
dard in other countries and the door will
close” (Barolo 1999c).
Although Sciences International had not
yet submitted to the U.S. EPA its full report
on phosphine, in December 1999, the U.S.
EPA made its final decision (Sharp 1999).
(This decision was published in the Federal
Register in February 2001 [U.S. EPA 2001]).
The U.S. EPA now mandated a “fumigation
management plan” like that proposed by the
Commodity Industry Coalition (U.S. EPA
2000). The agency also eliminated the inter-
species safety factor and left the old 0.3-ppm
standard in place, on condition that phos-
phine registrants conduct additional research
if Sciences International’s review was found to
be inadequate (U.S. EPA 2000). A coalition
member noted that “it is important to point
out that this additional work will take years
and that the current 0.3 ppm threshold will
stay in place during that time” (Sharp 1999).
R.J. Reynolds credited its leadership on the
scientific issues with saving the company
“many millions of dollars” (R.J. Reynolds
2000).
Conclusion
Although others have charged that agencies
responsible for protecting human health and
the environment are unduly inﬂuenced by the
industries they regulate (Abraham 2002; Huff
2002), it is rare to be able to study this process
from the perspective of the regulated industry.
This study provides documentation of the
behind-the-scenes activities of an industry as it
attempts to inﬂuence the regulatory process on
matters that have a direct bearing on public
health.
Our analysis has limitations. Given the
sheer volume and limited indexing of the
documents, it is impossible to ensure that we
located all potentially relevant documents.
Some may have been destroyed or concealed
by the tobacco companies (Liberman 2002);
others may have never been obtained in the
legal discovery process. In addition, we had no
access to pesticide company documents, except
those in the tobacco documents archives.
Finally, despite properly filed Freedom of
Information Act requests, we were unable to
obtain from the U.S. EPA documentation of
its meetings with the industry’s Commodity
Industry Coalition. All minutes of meetings
with stakeholders should be part of the public
record.
Despite these limitations, the case studies
discussed here provide insight into tactics that
the tobacco industry applies to a regulatory
agency when trying to inﬂuence the outcome
of a decision. These tactics go significantly
beyond the usual approaches—such as partici-
pation in public comment periods and public
meetings—to inﬂuence scientiﬁc and regula-
tory decision making. Tobacco industry tactics
described in these cases include:
• Encouraging a chemical company (Zoecon)
to advocate for high MRLs without any
supporting data and directing that same
company to gather information about inter-
national regulatory efforts on methoprene in
a manner designed to hide the interest of
the tobacco industry in this chemical;
• Attempting to forestall regulatory efforts
on tobacco pesticides in the European
Community by creating voluntary industry
MRLs for a subset of chemicals;
• Hiring an ex-WHO scientist to participate
(without disclosing his funding source) in
the WHO regulatory effort on EBDCs;
• Hiring several ex-U.S. EPA scientists to
inﬂuence the U.S. EPA’s regulatory decision
making on phosphine;
• Hiring scientific consultants with instruc-
tions to marshal data to support the tobacco
industry’s a priori arguments and funding
consultants to publish a report supporting
these arguments in a journal over which the
consultants had inﬂuence;
• Staging fumigations for the U.S. EPA with
the knowledge that the methodology was
ﬂawed and the results would show no emis-
sions problem.
Yet, as the case of European MRLs
showed, the tobacco industry does not always
work together effectively to inﬂuence regula-
tions. Tobacco companies may disagree about
regulatory strategies or conclude that inaction
is preferable to action that might have unin-
tended consequences. Moreover, the fact that
even voluntary, industry-friendly pesticide
guidelines posed significant problems for
Philip Morris underscores tobacco industry
motivation for resisting or influencing more
stringent, government-imposed regulations.
This study also raises questions about
industry inﬂuence over regulatory agencies. In
the case of WHO deliberations on EBDCs,
the tobacco industry coordinated covert
actions, hiding the ﬁnancial ties and involve-
ment of CORESTA. Rigorous disclosure
requirements and oversight might have
allowed the WHO’s agencies to judge more
accurately the potential for bias related to con-
ﬂicts of interest. In the case of the U.S. EPA’s
review of phosphine, a regulatory agency
appears to have been quite willing to cooper-
ate with the industry and its consultants. This
is a reminder of why regulatory processes were
designed to be transparent and open to the
public, and why “closed-door” meetings
between regulators and industry have been
ruled illegal (Federal Advisory Committee Act
1972; Registration Standards 2004; Special
Review Procedures 2002).
Protection of the public interest hinges on
an open process and regulatory agencies’ will-
ingness to stand up to pressure from regulated
industries. When these are in doubt, public
conﬁdence in the fairness and efﬁcacy of regu-
lations may be unwarranted. The resource
disparities between powerful industries and
public health organizations may also make it
difficult to ensure that the public interest is
fairly represented, particularly when discus-
sions occur behind closed doors, as apparently
occurred at the U.S. EPA. Increased public
and media scrutiny of these processes could
help ensure that public health considerations
are weighed at least as heavily as commercial
ones.
Finally, given the deadly epidemic of
tobacco-caused disease, which kills an esti-
mated 5 million people annually worldwide
(WHO 2004), is it in the public interest for
regulatory agencies today to continue facilitat-
ing standards that make it easier and less costly
to grow, transport, store, and manufacture
tobacco products?REFERENCES
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